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The Price of Doing Good: 
Executive Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines whether nonprofit executive pay patterns are consistent with 
the espoused social mission of these organizations. We find that nonprofit CEOs are paid 
a significant fixed component, and many CEOs also receive additional pay associated 
with managing larger sized organizations. Our analysis indicates that nonprofit executive 
compensation is not significantly related to CEO performance, as measured either by 
improved fund-raising results or better administrative efficiency. This weak pay-for-
performance link may be due in part to nonprofits’ concern about violating the non-
distribution constraint in the sector, which prohibits the distribution of excess earnings.  
While nonprofits may not be breaching the letter of the law, some organizations appear to 
challenging its spirit: We present evidence that CEO compensation is significantly higher 
in organizations where free cash flows is present, as measured by commercial revenues, 
liquid assets and investment portfolios.  
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by 
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Nonprofit organizations are an unmistakable part of the economy.  Today, there 
are over 1.5 million nonprofit organizations in the United States, employing 10.2 million 
people or 6.9% of the U.S. workforce and representing $621.4 billion in revenues (Boris 
and Steuerle, 1999). In the past few years alone, however, a series of financial scandals 
have shook several large nonprofits, including the NAACP, United Way, and Adelphi 
University. These high profile cases – along with the growing visibility of the sector – 
have generated calls for more accountability and oversight. At the center of the debate is 
the question of executive compensation in the nonprofit sector. 
Appropriate compensation is central to the long-term viability and success of the 
nonprofit sector. To protect their charitable purposes, nonprofits are legally prohibited 
from paying excessive compensation. While corporations are designed to profit maximize 
and pass earnings on to shareholders, nonprofit organizations are legally prohibited from 
making distributions, particularly that "inure to the private benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual."1 Hansmann (1980: 840) describes this requirement as: 
 A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from 
distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, 
such as members, officers, directors, or trustees…. Net earnings, if any, must be 
retained and devoted in their entirety to financing further production of services 
that the organization was formed to provide. 
 
Ideally, the non-distribution requirement overcomes market failures, arising from 
lack of trust, information asymmetries, and adverse selection (Hansmann 1980, Weisbrod 
1988).  By retaining annual surpluses, nonprofit organizations can, in theory, reassure 
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clients and donors that their social mission takes precedence over the financial 
remuneration of any interested parties. In service industries, such as childcare and 
medical services, the non-distribution requirement may serve as a commitment and trust 
device, indicating to consumers that the service provider will not provide substandard 
services in order to benefit financially. In exchange for eschewing profit and distribution, 
nonprofit organizations receive subsidies in the form of tax-exemption and charitable 
donations that in principle permit them to offer more social services at lower cost. In 
practice, however, these tax subsidies combined with weak corporate governance systems 
and a lack of external monitoring can create problems around incentives and rewards. 
In the for-profit setting, many of these problems are not present because clear 
financial incentives can be deployed based on the financial performance of the firm. Free 
to distribute excess earnings as rewards, business firms typically have a clearer set of 
objectives than do nonprofit organizations. Due to the non-distribution constraint, 
nonprofit compensation decisions have traditionally to been thought to be connected to 
the difficult to measure notion of “progress toward mission,” rather than based on growth 
in revenues or earnings, an approach that has been seen as improper for nonprofits (Kertz 
1997, Frumkin and Andre-Clark 1999). The challenge for nonprofits is thus to figure out  
how to compensate executives so as to motivate performance, while retaining a focus on 
mission fulfillment.  
To better understand whether existing compensation practices respect or violate 
the principle of the non-distribution constraint, we conduct a set of tests to examine the 
determinants of nonprofit CEO compensation. We consider three competing explanations 
for compensation patterns. First, we test whether compensation is related to legitimacy, 
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as measured by organizational size. Second, we see whether CEO compensation is related 
to managerial performance. Finally, we investigate whether CEO compensation is a 
function of the availability of free cash flows within organizations. In carrying out the 
analysis, we adopt a pooled regression approach using a stratified panel of nonprofit 
organizations developed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the 1993-1996 period.  
The paper proceeds in five steps. First, we begin by presenting background on the 
nonprofit sector and its unique organizational and legal characteristics, which frame the 
decisions made in the sector about compensation. Second, we develop our research 
hypotheses based on prior theoretical and empirical work. Third, we describe the panel 
data, the variables, and our research design. Fourth, we present the results of the analysis 
and interpret their meaning. Finally, we discuss the implications of the results for our 
understanding of nonprofit organizations. 
 
I. Background and Literature Review 
 
 
A. The Rationale for Tax-Exemption and the Non-Distribution Constraint  
 
In principle, the nonprofit organizational form allows society to overcome market 
failures and to increase the output of certain goods and services, without moving to direct 
government provision or the provision of subsidies to for-profit firms. To achieve greater 
social welfare, nonprofits are provided tax-exemptions and the ability to offer 
contributors tax-deductions for their charitable gifts. In exchange, nonprofits consent to 
certain corporate governance requirements and external oversight.  
Nonprofits generally operate in service areas characterized by externalities, 
uncertainty, information asymmetries, adverse selection, and consumer trust (Krashinsky, 
1986; Rose-Ackerman 1986; Weisbrod, 1988). By using their resources to fulfill their 
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missions rather than to benefit private parties, nonprofit organizations attempt to 
overcome market or "contract failures" (Hansmann 1980). The non-distribution constraint 
offers a contractual assurance that consumers will not be taken advantage of by 
nonprofits and that resources will be used to meet public needs rather than for personal 
gain.  As a result, this commitment device fosters consumer trust and confidence that the 
transaction will result in a fair exchange. 
The problem of market or contract failure often occurs when the funder and the 
recipient of the service are distanced from one another. In some charities, donors are 
unable to see the actual recipients of their money due to physical distance or privacy 
issues. For example, donors that respond to appeals for disaster relief do so because they 
trust the charities to use their donations responsibly. This trust is predicated on the non-
distribution constraint and adherence to it by nonprofit employees.  For organizations that 
charge a fee directly to service recipients, the problem of contract failure is somewhat 
different. In fee-based nonprofits, the person paying the fee is the consumer of the 
service. Consumers select these services based on set of assumptions regarding the costs 
and benefits of the service and the reputation of the nonprofit provider. Thus, for 
example, nonprofit day care centers enjoy broad popularity because many parents prefer 
to have their children’s care governed by factors other than the bottom line. By removing 
the profit motive and operating subject to the non-distribution constraint, nonprofits can 
deliver services in a way that inspires confidence in the consumer.  
 To encourage them to respond to market failures, nonprofit organizations are 
offered unique tax opportunities that contribute to their economic success. First, 
nonprofits are granted tax-exemption from most income, sales, and property taxes at the 
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federal, state, and local level. Second, nonprofit organizations can fund themselves 
through tax-free debt. Third, nonprofit organizations are not expected to generate an 
economic return for the residual claimants. The effect of these tax benefits and lack of 
profit motive is depicted in Figure 1. 2 
PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Under competitive situations, a for-profit firm (fp) will supply output of yfp at the 
break-even price of pfp. Due to tax-exemption and lower cost of capital, nonprofit 
organizations (np) can generate greater output (ynp) at a lower price (pnp). By selling their 
services at a lower price, nonprofits are able to serve a population that would have been 
excluded under the market solution. 
 Since the benefits of tax-exemption could enable nonprofits to out compete taxed 
for-profit firms, exemption from taxation is only granted for certain activities. To be 
eligible for these tax concessions, an organization must be organized and operated “for 
charitable, religious, educational, scientific, or other purposes” as forth in §501(c) of the 
IRS code.3 Essentially, this tax policy is designed to increase social welfare (increasing it 
from the area defined by ABC to ABD) by expanding the production of socially 
beneficial goods and services. The tax-exemption makes it difficult for for-profit firms to 
operate profitably in certain social service activities. Nonprofits, in contrast, can earn tax-
free program service revenue as long as their services are consistent with their charitable 
mission.  
 Many nonprofits also benefit from a second advantage: tax-deductible charitable 
contributions. Individual and corporate donors receive a tax deduction for their charitable 
gifts to nonprofit organizations that are public, not member, serving. Nonprofits can use 
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this subsidy to offer services to persons that cannot afford to pay, even the lower 
nonprofit price for services. Contributions shift the nonprofit supply further away from 
the for-profit supply to a new equilibrium output (ynpc) at an even lower price (pnpc). By 
selling services to some clients at pnpc, nonprofits can use donations to provide free or 
below-cost services to other clients. As long as this decision is consistent with their 
mission, non-profits can price discriminate. Through contributions, social welfare can be 
increased even further from social welfare from ABD to AEF as seen in Figure 2. 
PLACE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
While tax-exemptions can increase social welfare, they can foster agency 
problems that undercut the long-term value of nonprofits. Free of taxes and bolstered by 
charitable contributions, nonprofit organizations can increase output and lower price to 
the nonprofit competitive equilibrium point (ynpc, pnpc). The nonprofit managers, however, 
can collude to lower outcomes and raise prices from this equilibrium. As long as the 
output (ya) is higher and price (pa) is lower than the for-profit competitive equilibrium 
(yfp, pfp), nonprofits will not face competition from for-profit firms. The collusion 
imposes a deadweight loss to society (equal to the reduction in social welfare) and 
provides the nonprofit with excess profits. The collusion can persist since the outcomes 
(y) generated by nonprofit organizations are intangible and long-term in nature, making 
them difficult to measure, verify or control. 
Based on this analysis of how excess profits can be generated in a nonprofit 
setting, the paper proceeds to explore whether and why these profits might be distributed 
to employees rather than invested in future service provision. 
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B. The Challenges of Nonprofit Compensation  
 To fulfill their missions, nonprofits need to select and motivate employees by 
paying reasonable but not excessive compensation. Given that non-profits often operate 
in non-competitive environments and benefit from tax-exemption and charitable 
contributions, managers have the opportunity to be paid excessively, work inefficiently, 
or divert resources from fulfilling their organizations’ missions. If revealed, these 
activities can undermine public trust. We discuss the legal mechanisms available to 
regulate managerial compensation and behavior. 
 Reasonable but not Excessive Compensation. Numerous compensation studies 
indicate that the standard compensation for nonprofit workers and executives is lower 
than their employees in comparable positions in for-profit firms (Preston 1989, Steinberg 
1990, Handy and Katz 1998, and Ruhm and Borkoski 2000). Several theories could 
explain this finding: Many who choose to work in the nonprofit sector engage in “labor 
donations,” preferring altruistic and other non-pecuniary benefits to monetary rewards 
(Rose-Ackerman 1986, Preston 1989). Wages may be lower in nonprofit jobs as a 
screening device, attracting only those managers willing to restrain their desire for profit 
(Young 1977; Hansmann 1980). These theories suggest that paying nonprofit executive 
salaries that rival those in the business would be highly problematic given expressive 
character and social orientation of these organizations (Mason 1996).  
 Other management researchers have argued that nonprofits must pay their best 
workers wages that are competitive with those of business firms in order to attract and 
retain the most talented and capable people (Pappas 1995; Drucker 1992). Those backing 
"comparable pay" argue that the success of nonprofit organizations relies on good 
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management precisely because of the difficulty in assessing a true bottom line in 
nonprofits. Given the service-oriented nature of the industry, the uncertainty of funding, 
and difficult-to-measures outcomes, nonprofit organizations must be willing to spend 
aggressively to attract and retain top quality human capital. Because the work of many 
nonprofits is growing ever more complex and demanding, personnel with strong 
management and leadership skills are needed to ensure organizational growth and 
capacity building (Letts, Ryan and Grossman 1999).  
While many nonprofit executives’ pay may be relatively low, especially at smaller 
agencies, a series of  recent scandals has led the government to investigate the financial 
management and compensation practices in the sector. As part of its oversight of tax-
exempt organizations, the IRS is responsible for defining excess compensation and for 
pursuing enforcement actions. Compensation has been deemed to be excessive if it 
“exceeds what is reasonable under all the circumstances.” In contrast, compensation is 
reasonable “if it is only such amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services by like 
enterprises under like circumstances.”4 Historically, and during our sample period, the 
IRS had only one penalty available to sanction nonprofits that paid excessive 
compensation. The IRS could revoke the tax-exemption of such an organization. Given 
the difficulty of determining if excess compensation was being paid and the draconian 
nature of the sanction, enforcement actions were extremely rare.5  
Legislation enacted in 1999 permits the IRS to impose an alternative penalty, an 
excise tax, on nonprofits that pay staff excessive compensation. Enforcement actions may 
become more prevalent due to public pressure and the ability of the IRS to impose a more 
moderate penalty. One aspect of the legislation has been questioned: The principal test to 
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determine if an executive is overcompensated it to look at salaries at comparable 
institutions. Nonprofits can protect themselves from IRS sanction by establishing  
“rebuttable presumptions”  that their compensation decisions are reasonable by compiling 
research demonstrating that comparable organizations pay their executives similar 
salaries.  
 Non-distribution Constraint.  A lingering concern associated with nonprofit  
compensation is that management may divert excess earnings away from providing future 
services. Traditional agency theory recommends that principals should offer agents 
incentives to encourage effort and reduce perquisite behavior (Jensen and Meckling 1979, 
Fama 1980). However, paying incentives based on excess earnings directly conflicts with 
the non-distribution requirement, since revenues or cost savings are converted into in 
higher salaries and benefits for staff rather than services for clients.6 For this reason, non-
profits have traditionally sought to avoid paying employees compensation based on the 
financial performance of the organization.  
 Recently, limited incentive compensation has begun to be used in the non-profit 
industry. Compensation consultants argue that pay-for-performance results in improved 
employee productivity and retention, which translates into increased revenues and 
efficiencies (Barbeito and Bowman 1998). This view assumes that nonprofit 
organizations operate comparably to for-profit firms. In for-profit businesses, the 
principal or owner can induce better performance by providing incentives to a risk-
bearing manager, and the incentives can be structured to maximize the principal’s utility. 
In a non-profit firm, the agent is the manager, but there is no legal residual claimant to 
serve as the principal (although in some organizations, boards operate as an effective 
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surrogate). In addition, the appropriate objective function is difficult to define and 
associated programmatic outputs are hard to observe and measure (Alchian and Demsetz 
1972; Borjas, Frech III and Ginsburg 1983). In such circumstances, seeking to shape 
managers performance by linking pay with financial results may be problematic.  
 
II. Research Hypotheses 
Against this complex backdrop of conditions and constraints in the nonprofit sector, 
we examine the determinants of nonprofit compensation. In particular, we focus on two 
threats to public trust: excess compensation and violation of the non-distribution 
constraint. This approach is different from the recent literature. Some research has  
explored the differences between nonprofit and for-profit compensation levels (Borjas, 
Frech III and Ginsburg 1983; Frank 1996; Goddeeris 1988; Johnson and Rudney 1987; 
Mocan and Viola 1997; Preston 1989). Several studies have examined a related topic -- 
the pay-performance link -- but have a more restricted scope. Roomkin and Weisbrod 
(1999) and Brickley and Van Horn (2000) focus on profit and non-profit hospitals, while 
others concentrated on variations in executive pay (Oster 1998; Baber, Daniel, and 
Roberts 1999; Hallock 2000). We explore the robustness of non-distribution constraint by 
constructing three hypotheses about the determinants of nonprofit compensation. 
 
A. Legitimacy: Organizational Size  
Extensive for-profit research indicates that corporate executive compensation is a 
function of organizational size.7 Murphy (1998) argues that size is a proxy for managerial 
skill requirements, job complexity, and span of control. Nonprofit compensation research  
also suggests that that size may be an important determinant of CEO compensation 
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(Hallock 2000). Size or organizational scale may actually be a more significant 
determinant of compensation in non-profit than for-profit organization since inputs such 
as program expenses and tangible assets are the most visible and measurable element of 
the organization’s production process.   
Organizational size may also be an important factor in pay because governing 
boards often determine compensation by benchmarking against senior executives in 
nonprofits that are comparable in size and industry focus (Barbeito and Bowman 1998). 
A growing number of professional associations across fields of nonprofit activity now 
actively collect and disseminate compensation studies, which report average salaries and 
benefits for executives at organizations across different budget categories. Boards are 
able to rely on this data to guide their compensation decisions.  
Finally, organizational size provides legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 
1995; Zucker, 1988). Large institutions typically garner more publicity, have higher 
prestige, and are viewed as more effective by virtue of the scope of their activities. 
Moreover, boards at large institutions are typically made up of leaders from the 
community, whose judgment is less likely to be subject to questioning and critical 
scrutiny. Managers can and do receive larger compensation packages at these larger 
institutions because they are simply perceived as deserving and entitled to earn more. We 
posit as a first hypothesis: 
H1: The larger the size of a nonprofit organization, the higher the CEO 
compensation. 
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B. Performance: Incentive Pay  
 As nonprofit boards deliberate over the question of how much to compensate their 
CEOs, one compelling criterion is managerial performance. Nonprofit management has 
become increasingly understood as a legitimate profession, with its own body of expert 
knowledge and a set of best practices (Light, 2000). Leaders of major nonprofit 
organizations have come to adopt a more business-like approach to their work, adopting 
concepts such as quality management, process reengineering, and benchmarking from the 
world of corporate strategy. As outlined in the prior section, pay-for-performance in the 
nonprofit sector is especially problematic due to the difficulties in measuring 
performance and the risk of violating the non-distribution constraint. Two forms of 
performance have been the focus of most incentive plans: fund-raising and cost 
efficiencies.  
While many large organizations have development staffs that manage the fund 
raising process, the CEO is ultimately responsible for the financial position of their 
organization. The ability to raise large amounts of money is also frequently taken as a 
sign that the organization is performing well. The logic is that donors reward 
organizations that are doing good work and punish those that are not by withholding 
contributions. As a proxy for mission fulfillment, fund raising results at least provides an 
easily measured metric that can be tracked from year to year. To the extent that 
nonprofits pay their executives based on their performance, successful fundraising thus 
turns out to be a central component of any judgment about managerial success or failure. 
 The other way that managerial performance can be judged is related to the way 
resources are used. Because the nonprofit sector is governed by a culture of service, few 
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organizations tolerate the wasting of resources. Frugality is a virtue in nonprofits. 
Administrative cost cutting in nonprofits is often an organizational necessity, especially 
when revenues are flat or lag or when the public need met by the nonprofit is extremely 
pressing, making waste unacceptable. By driving down administrative expenses, some 
nonprofit managers believe they are at the same time increasing their ability to execute on 
their mission. Some funders and watchdog organizations interpret low ratios of 
administrative to total expenses as a sign that a nonprofit is well run and mission-focused. 
We hypothesize therefore: 
H2: The better the managerial performance, the higher the CEO compensation. 
 
 
C. Cash Availability: Free Cash Flows 
 Beyond organizational size and performance, nonprofit compensation decisions 
can also be shaped by the presence of excess funds within the organization and the 
amount of oversight that is directed at the organization. Unrestricted funds within 
organizations give nonprofit boards the ability to use “free cash” for non-essential and 
non-budget items, including increased salaries and benefits for senior staff. There at 
least three major sources of unrestricted funds: First nonprofits may have commercial or 
earned revenues that are not subject to oversight by donors. Nonprofits that receive large 
amounts of earned income from the charging of fees typically have substantially more 
freedom than their charitably supported counterparts when it comes to the allocation of 
resources. Users and clients tend to focus more on the convenience and cost of the 
services rendered, rather than on the underlying financial practices of the nonprofit 
organization. Earned income rarely requires program or financial reporting to outside 
parties, but instead relies on customer satisfaction. Few service consumers review 
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financial statements or monitor organizational decision making. If the paying clients are 
satisfied and if fee income generates surpluses, nonprofits end up having considerable 
discretion in making operating and compensation decisions. 
 Second, nonprofits may have high levels of liquidity that gives them some 
flexibility in spending. Since many nonprofits operate with an annual budget, existing 
and expected cash flows are committed to program services, purchasing tangible assets, 
or invested in the endowment. However, nonprofits regularly receive unexpected cash in 
the form of unrestricted contributions. Often these contributions are small and come 
from a broad base of supporters. Sometimes these unconditional gifts are solicited 
through direct mail campaigns, other times they are the product on loyalty and years of 
support from donors who have come to trust the nonprofit. Unlike restricted grants, 
these funds do not trigger monitoring and oversight. These unexpected funds are 
frequently held as liquid assets and can be used to justify one-time or permanent 
increases in salaries or benefits. 
 Finally, some organizations may have endowments. A portion or all of the 
interest from these funds is used annually to support the general budget or some 
restricted purpose. Endowments decrease pressure on managers to raise funds through 
annual appeals and reduce the monitoring that may accompany new donations. Given 
the favorable stock market performance in the 1990s, some nonprofits have been able to 
use capital gains to cover increases in operating costs. Thus, organizations with 
endowments will tend to have more discretionary cash available than organizations 
operating without the cushion and protection that endowments provide. 
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Although the non-distribution constraint is legally violated by distributing “excess 
earnings,” the payment of free cash flows to executives can be viewed as breaking “the 
spirit” of the contract. Our third research hypothesis is: 
H3: The greater the cash availability or free cash flows, the higher the CEO 
compensation. 
 
 
 In carrying out our analysis, we are interested in isolating the main determinants 
of nonprofit compensation and their implications for the strength and meaning of the non-
distribution constraint. While any link between resources growth and compensation 
might appear questionable and potentially problematic, only a strong link between fund-
raising results and increased executive compensation would present clear evidence of 
diversion of the excess revenues to non-mission related purposes. The potential  
implications of a significant relationship between organizational size and free cash are 
more subtle and complex. 
 
III. Research Design 
 
A. Data and Sample Selection 
The sample data used in our analysis originates from the annual Form 990 non-
profit tax filings. The sample population is drawn from the non-profit organizations 
contained in the panel data prepared by the Statistics on Income (SOI) office of the IRS. 
The annual data is repackaged and disseminated to academic researchers by the Urban 
Institute’s National Center on Charitable Statistics (NCCS). The annual data files were 
combined into a single database. Due to inaccuracies in the fiscal year field, tests were 
conducted to remove duplicate observations initially marked as being from different 
fiscal years and to relabel fiscal years to ensure that ending total assets for one year 
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equaled the opening assets for the subsequent one. The final sample totals 6,590 non-
profit organizations drawn from 1993-1995 SOI panel, for a total of 15,350 observations 
as shown in Table 1. The 1992 SOI panel is used to help develop lagged variables for 
estimation. 
Our analysis begins with a consideration of the correlations between the variables 
(see Table 2). As expected, there is a high degree of correlation between executive salary 
and total executive compensation (0.99), but the relationship between executive benefits 
and total compensation was considerably weaker (0.29).  The explanatory variables the 
most strongly correlated with total compensation are total fixed assets (0.13), total 
program expenses (0.10), and commercial revenue share (0.09).  Among the other 
independent variables, many of the highest correlations are to total fixed assets. Total 
program expenses, dollar growth in contributions, and commercial revenue share have 
correlations to total fixed assets of 0.58, 0.14, and 0.14, respectively.  
 
B. Model Development 
 We adopt a pooled specification as follows:  
εβ
ββ
ββ
ββα
  Assets Total-to-Portfolio Investment 
Assets LiquidtoExpensesShare Revenue Commercial
Growthon ContributiEfficiency tiveAdministra
Expenses Program TotalAssets Fixed TotalonCompensati
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++
−−+
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+++=it
         
The model is employed at the industry-wide level and for each of six major sub-sector 
classifications based on the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities: Arts, Education, 
Health, Human Services, Religious and Other (which is primarily public and societal 
benefit organizations).  We assess the statistical significance of individual variables using 
 18
a t-test that controls for firm dependence.8 To assess the relative explanatory power of 
groups of variables, we use the Vuong test (1989) z-statistic. 
For our dependent variables, we use three different measures of compensation: 
CEO salary, CEO benefits and total CEO compensation. The last variable simply 
combines executive salary and benefits. The compensation data is drawn from the salary 
and benefits of the officers, directors and key employees reported on Part V of the IRS 
990 Form. Since the coded data does not indicate the job title, we assume that the highest 
paid individual is the CEO or Executive Director. With the potential exception of 
hospitals and some universities, practitioner compensation studies generally support this 
assumption. (Barbeito and Bowman 1998). We included both executive pension plan and 
expense account expenditures in our measure of benefits. 
To test our first hypothesis, we rely on two variables: lagged total fixed assets and 
lagged total program expenses. Prior studies have generally used total assets or log of 
total assets to proxy for size (Hallock 2000).  Our field experience with nonprofits leads 
us to believe that boards set CEO compensation base on annual budgets and scale of 
operations in comparison to industry peers. We chose total fixed assets (which includes 
land, building, and equipment) as a proxy for scale of operations and total program 
expenses as a measure of the annual budget. In nonprofits, total program expenses 
include costs of program services, but exclude administrative and fund-raising expenses. 
We expect CEO compensation to be positively associated with both fixed assets and 
program expenses.  
We developed two variables associated with our pay-for-performance hypothesis. 
Due to the non-distribution constraint, boards have difficulty rewarding CEOs directly for 
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cost savings. The ratio of administrative expenses to total expenses is a standard measure 
of overhead in the nonprofit industry. Boards view that the lower this ratio, the higher the 
efficiency of operations. To measure administrative efficiency, we take one minus the 
overhead ratio to construct the ratio of non-administrative expenses to total expenses. 
Hence, we expect that CEO compensation to be positively associated with the ratio of 
non-administrative expenses to total expenses.9  
To supplement this variable, we include a second measure of CEO performance: 
dollar growth in contributed revenue. A critical part of the work of most nonprofit CEOs 
is raising money for the organization. The increase in contributed revenue is a 
particularly observable measure that boards may correlate with CEO effort. Other 
revenue sources, such as program service revenue, investment income, and special event 
revenue, may not be as closely tied to CEO performance. If nonprofits are adopting a 
more performance-based compensation approach, then we expect that growth in 
contributed revenue will be positively associated with compensation. However, since 
some incentive pay may be interpreted as a violation of the non-distribution constraint, 
boards elect not to reward CEOs directly for increasing contributions. Additionally, we 
may fail to find a significant relation because restricted contributions bear donor-imposed 
restrictions, which often include limitations on the funds spent on personnel services.10  
To test our third hypothesis, we selected three variables that determine whether an 
organization is cash constrained or has free cash flows. First, we considered lagged 
commercial revenue as a share of total revenue. Commercial revenues are composed of 
proceeds from sales of goods as well as program service fees and charges generally paid 
by clients, insurance companies or some government agencies. Often, these funds are 
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relatively free of donor oversight or outside imposed restrictions. We expect CEO 
compensation to be higher in organizations that have a greater reliance on commercial 
revenues. Second, we create a measure of liquid assets to expenses. Liquid assets are 
computed using cash plus receivables less payables. This ratio indicates the proportion of 
annual expenses that can be paid out of liquid assets and provides a sense of the 
organization’s debt-paying ability. We anticipate that CEO compensation will be 
positively related to this ratio. Third, we expect that CEO compensation is positively 
associated with endowments that help pay for general and administrative costs and reduce 
the scrutiny associated with new donations. We use the investment portfolio to total 
assets ratio as this proxy.  
IV. Results 
A. Industry-Wide Regressions  
To commence our analysis, we ran industry-wide regressions to understand the 
overall relation between compensation and the explanatory variables. Table 3 provides 
the results using three different dependent variables (total CEO compensation, CEO 
salary, and CEO benefits). For all three models, we find that a significant fixed 
component to pay (as measured by the constant) with each CEO receiving almost 
$97,000 in annual salary and over $12,000 in benefits.  
CEO compensation is positively related to the measures of organizational size. 
For every thousand dollars of fixed assets or program expenses, a CEO’s total 
compensation increases $0.25 and $0.07, respectively. In these industry-wide regressions, 
we find less support for the incentive pay hypothesis. While total CEO compensation is 
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not significantly related to either incentive/performance measure, administrative 
efficiency are significantly and positively related to CEO benefits.  
The free cash flow measures are significantly associated with compensation. A 
one percent increase in the commercial revenue share increases CEO compensation by 
just over $600.  In addition, CEO compensation is positively related to the relative size of 
the investment portfolio. Finally, we find that CEO benefits are significantly associated 
with the size of the investment portfolio.  
In the total compensation and salary regressions, no one hypothesis accounts for 
significantly more of variance in compensation (Table 5, Panel A). When free cash flow 
variables are not taken into consideration, then the pay-for-performance variables explain 
substantially more than However, the Vuong test reveals that free cash flow explains 
substantially more of the variance in CEO benefits than the other two hypotheses 
individually and combined (z-stat= -2.15). 
 
B. Industry-Specific Regressions  
 Since the nonprofit industry is quite heterogeneous, we explore the compensation 
question in the major sub-sectors. In Table 4, we provide the results of industry-specific 
regressions examining total CEO compensation. With the exception of the health field, 
each of the sub-sector regressions has substantially higher explanatory power (as 
measured by R2). In five of the six sub-sectors, executives receive a significant fixed 
portion to their compensation, receiving a base of $80,000 or more. Only in the religious 
sub-sector is the constant relatively low ($23,750) and insignificant. 
 The examination of the arts sector reveals that CEO compensation is significantly 
related to total fixed assets, commercial revenue share and the investment portfolio as a 
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percentage of total assets. The arts organizations included in the SOI panel are composed 
primarily of performing arts organizations and museums. In contrast to other sub-sectors, 
the compensation of CEOs increases most strongly with total fixed assets ($1.29 increase 
in pay for each $1,000 in fixed assets), commercial revenue share (over $780 raise for a 
one percent higher commercial revenue share) and also investment portfolio-to-total 
assets (almost $300 for a 1 percent higher investment portfolio). The free cash flow 
variables explain a substantially greater proportion of the variation in compensation for 
arts CEO than the other two hypotheses combined (z-stat= -3.48) (Table 5, Panel B). 
 While arts executive pay is closely related to fixed assets, CEOs at educational 
institutions receive compensation that is significantly associated with total program 
expenses. These organizations include primary and secondary schools as well as colleges 
and universities. Similar to arts CEOs, educational leaders are better compensated when 
their organizations have a relatively larger commercial revenue share. In the education 
sector as in the arts area, the set of free cash flow variables have a significantly higher 
explanatory power than the other variables. 
 In the health sector, the only significant determinants of CEO compensation are 
the commercial revenue share and the liquid asset-to-expense ratio. A one percent gain in 
commercial revenues relative to total revenues translates into a $260 rise in CEO 
compensation, and a similar increase in liquid assets to expenses results in $11 dollars in 
additional pay. No one group of variables dominates in explaining total compensation, 
but in untabulated results, the free cash flow variables outweigh the two other hypotheses 
in explaining CEO benefits. Given that often the highest paid employee at hospitals is 
rarely if ever the CEO, we reran the health sector regression excluding hospitals. We find 
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that both size variables are significant along with administrative efficiency and the liquid 
assets-to-expense ratio. For this subgroup, the set of free cash flow variables dominate 
the other explanatory factors (z-stat = -1.95).  
 The compensation of human services CEOs is closely related to variables 
associated with all three hypotheses. Both organizational size variables, total fixed assets 
and total program services were significant as was one incentive variable, dollar growth 
in contributions, and two free cash flow variables, liquid assets-to-expenses and 
investment portfolio-to-total assets. The human services area is the only sector that 
exhibited a significant relation between compensation and dollar growth in contributions. 
Not only is this component of pay incentive-related, but also it could be potentially 
interpreted as a violation of the non-distribution constraint. The human service sector is 
the only segment of the nonprofit industry, in which the free cash flow hypotheses is 
significantly outweighed by the other two hypotheses (z-stat= 6.81).   
Compensation for religious leaders differs substantially from pay in the other 
sectors. First, the fixed component of pay is much lower and is not significant. In 
addition, none of the explanatory variables are significant. One potential interpretation is 
that religious leaders make substantial altruistic labor donations. These executives’ pay 
does not seem to increase in response to greater size, cash availability or performance.  
The religious nature of the organizations may mean that other omitted factors are the key 
drivers of compensation.   
Finally, compensation at public benefit and other organizations is significantly 
shaped by four of the seven explanatory variables. Executives in this category are the 
only ones whose compensation is significantly related to the administrative efficiency 
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ratio. A one percent increase in the administrative efficiency ratio equates to a $485 
increase in compensation. No one hypothesis has relatively higher explanatory power 
than the others for these organizations. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Nonprofits operate to provide a public benefit, and most rely upon donations and 
trust to carry out their work. Excessive nonprofit salaries or diversions of resources away 
from services to outside parties or employees can undermine public confidence, hurting 
not only nonprofit organizations and their clients, but also the sector as a whole. The non-
distribution constraint bearing on nonprofit organizations provides a contractual 
assurance that the consumer will not be taken advantage of or betrayed by producers for 
personal gains. Bound by this promise to use resources to advance their missions rather 
than to benefit private parties, nonprofit organizations emerge as a solution to market or 
“contract failures.” People seek out nonprofits in areas where they cannot penetrate and 
police services using ordinary contractual devices, in situations where trust and 
information are scarce, and assessing the value of the services they receive for their 
money is difficult.  
To better understand whether excessive compensation or violations of the 
distribution constraint are frequent in the sector, we examined the factors associated with 
CEO compensation. We found that nonprofit CEOs are paid a significant fixed 
component, and many CEOs also receive additional pay associated with larger 
organizational size.  Our results indicate that nonprofit executive compensation is not 
significantly related to CEO performance. While our analysis suggests that nonprofits 
may not literally be violating the non-distribution constraint, we did find evidence that 
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CEO compensation is significantly higher in the presence of free cash flows. In three of 
the six industry sub-sectors, CEO compensation is determined by free cash flows rather 
than organizational size or CEO performance. 
New intermediate sanction regulations have recently been put in place to penalize 
nonprofits that excessively compensate executives. These regulations determine the 
reasonableness of executive compensation based on benchmarking against comparable 
organizations. Our analysis suggests strong industry-specific similarities in pay are 
related to free cash flows and, to a lesser extent, organizational size, rather than to 
performance. Hence, the new regulations may not be particularly effective in identifying 
either absolute levels of compensation that are too high or organizations that are violating 
the spirit of the non-distribution constraint.  
One final implication of our analysis bears on the enduring performance 
measurement quandary that confronts so many nonprofit organizations. We believe that 
nonprofit organizations may be relying on organizational size to make compensation 
decisions and drawing on free cash flows when available rather than address the 
challenge of defining, quantifying, and measuring the social benefits that nonprofits 
produce. Nonprofit organizations typically produce services that are complex and that 
produce not only direct outputs but also indirect, long-term societal benefits. These types 
of services often make it difficult to both develop good outcome measures and establish 
causality between program activity and client effects.  In the absence of effective metrics  
of social performance and mission accomplishment, many organizations rely on other 
factors in setting compensation. Perhaps once better measures of mission fulfillment are 
developed and actively used, nonprofits will be able to structure CEO compensation in 
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ways that provide appropriate incentives to managers, while respecting the full meaning 
of the non-distribution constraint.  
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Figure 1 
 
Non-profit vs. For-Profit Supply-Demand Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 Non-profit Supply-Demand Diagram including Contributions 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Observations by SOI Panel Year 
Year Observations 
1993   4,914 
1994   5,036 
1995   5,400 
Total 15,350 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Observations by Industry Classification 
Classification Observations Firms 
Arts 862  353  
Education 3,539 1,399  
Health 5,736  2,394  
Human Services 2,120  933  
Religious 108  45  
Other 2,985  1,466  
Total 15,350  6,590  
 
Panel C: Characteristics by Industry Classification 
    Human   
 Arts Education Health Services Religious Other 
Total Fixed Assets      
Mean 12,600 38,000 41,800 11,900 3,573 13,400 
Median 4,800 11,400 17,900 6,375 165 1,665 
St. Deviation 22,600 114,000 118,000 22,100 6,978 38,200 
Total Program Expenses     
Mean 14,300 43,900 80,600 12,200 5,129 37,300 
Median 4,168 13,000 34,600 5,609 1,526 6,679 
St. Deviation 37,600 134,000 256,000 43,700 9,134 336,000 
Administrative Efficiency    
Mean 76.1% 83.1% 84.5% 84.5% 84.6% 83.5% 
Median 81.8% 86.9% 87.6% 88.0% 90.1% 88.1% 
St. Deviation 81.2% 85.8% 85.6% 86.2% 82.3% 83.5% 
Dollar Growth in Contributions     
Mean 110.3 921.3 211.8 182.0 189.2 470.6 
Median 23.1 27.1 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.0 
St. Deviation 10,800.0 8,905.0 7,451.1 4,731.3 1,132.1 7,662.9 
Commercial Revenue Share     
Mean 25.0% 58.2% 79.8% 55.5% 26.8% 37.2% 
Median 15.4% 68.5% 95.6% 66.2% 1.3% 13.8% 
St. Deviation 26.0% 30.1% 32.8% 38.2% 34.7% 41.0% 
Liquid Assets/Expenses      
Mean 70.0% 27.3% 48.1% 90.9% -1.9% 79.8% 
Median 25.8% 12.6% 12.9% 12.2% 20.6% 21.5% 
St. Deviation 272.3% 160.8% 663.4% 2783.1% 658.4% 423.3% 
Investment Portfolio/Total Assets     
Mean 33.6% 35.5% 16.3% 17.9% 38.4% 32.5% 
Median 25.9% 32.8% 1.8% 2.4% 16.5% 15.5% 
St. Deviation 41.1% 28.7% 27.1% 27.8% 41.7% 36.4% 
 Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 Mean St. Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Total CEO 
Compensation 
 
157,061 311,343 1.00          
2. CEO Salary 138,886 301,337 0.99 1.00         
3. CEO Benefits 18,175 45,848 0.29 0.15 1.00        
4. Total Fixed 
Assets 
(per $1,000) 
28,300 91,900 0.11 0.10 0.12 1.00       
5. Total Program 
Expenses  
(per $1,000) 
47,800 21,700 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.59 1.00      
6.Administrative 
Efficiency 83.5% 84.8% 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 1.00     
7. Dollar Growth in 
Contributions  
(per $1,000) 
3,425 7,386 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.06 0.02 1.00    
8. Commercial 
Revenue 
Share 
59.0% 39.2% 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.11 -0.01 1.00   
9. Liquid Assets/ 
Expenses 26.54 2,331 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 1.00  
10. Investment 
Portfolio/ 
Total Assets 
25.0% 30.1% -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.42 -0.01 1.00 
 
 Table 3 
Compensation Analysis by Type of Compensation 
 
  
Directional 
Prediction 
Total 
CEO 
Compensation 
 
CEO 
Salary 
 
CEO 
Benefits 
 
Constant 
 
+ 
 
109,159.60*** 
 
96,902.94*** 
 
12,256.62*** 
 
Total Fixed Assets 
(per $1,000) 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
0.25*** 
 
 
0.19*** 
 
 
0.05** 
Total Program 
Expenses 
(per $1,000) 
 
 
+ 
 
 
0.07** 
 
 
0.07*** 
 
 
0.00 
Administrative 
Efficiency 
 
 
+ 
 
7,404.19 
 
-627.62 
 
8,031.81*** 
Dollar Growth in 
Contributions  
(per $1,000) 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
-0.32 
 
 
-0.23 
 
 
-0.08 
Commercial 
Revenue Share 
 
 
+ 
 
60,011.33*** 
 
52,681.56*** 
 
7,329.77*** 
Liquid Assets/ 
Expenses 
  
 
+ 
 
94.13 
 
60.25 
 
33.88 
Investment 
Portfolio/ 
Total Assets 
 
+ 
 
10,380.49* 
 
5,716.28 
 
4,664.21*** 
 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
Observations 
 
Number of Firms 
  
0.02 
 
15,350 
 
6,590 
 
0.02 
 
15,350 
 
6,590 
 
0.02 
 
15,350 
 
6,590 
*    p-value (two-sided) **    p-value (two-sided)  ***   p-value (two-sided) 
 
The p-values are computed using White’s robust standard errors (White [1980]). In addition, the estimator of 
variance used assumes the observations are not independent but that they are divided in M groups (i.e., firms) 
G1, G2, ..., GM that are independent. Specifically, the estimator is $V ( )( )' ( )u uG Gk
M
=
∑ 1 $V , where $V  = (∂2ln 
L/∂β2)-1 and uk(G) is the contribution of the kth group to the scores ∂ln L/∂β (Huber [1967] and Rogers[1993]). 
 Table 4 
Compensation Analysis by Major Industry Classifications 
 
  
Arts 
 
Education 
 
Health 
Human 
Services 
 
Religious 
 
Other 
 
Constant 
 
 
81,139.98*** 
 
100,773.20*** 
 
151,477.30*** 
 
81,362.49*** 
 
23,749.76 
 
120,596.80*** 
Total Fixed Assets 
(per $1,000) 
 
 
1.29*** 
 
0.14 
 
0.29 
 
0.58*** 
 
2.01 
 
0.50** 
Total Program 
Expenses 
(per $1,000) 
 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
0.14* 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
0.32*** 
 
 
1.83 
 
 
0.07*** 
Administrative 
Efficiency 
 
 
7,886.84 
 
-51,537.79 
 
7,872.52 
 
11,291.98 
 
-27,441.96 
 
48,484.03** 
Dollar Growth in 
Contributions  
(per $1,000) 
 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
-0.29 
 
 
-0.44 
 
 
1.53* 
 
 
-2.75 
 
 
-0.34 
Commercial Revenue  
Share 
 
 
78,690.43*** 
 
30,864.63** 
 
44,218.61*** 
 
4,130.96 
 
20,022.87 
 
51,849.11*** 
Liquid Assets/ 
Expenses 
 
 
2,450.82** 
 
1,527.57 
 
1,059.01*** 
 
-50.22*** 
 
213.40 
 
-697.16 
Investment Portfolio/ 
Total Assets 
 
 
29,890.95** 
 
6,332.53 
 
15,083.73 
 
26,736.62*** 
 
38,772.59 
 
3,701.65 
 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
Observations 
 
Number of Firms 
 
0.19 
 
862 
 
353 
 
0.07 
 
3,539 
 
1,399 
 
0.01 
 
5,736 
 
2,394 
 
0.12 
 
2,120 
 
933 
 
0.20 
 
108 
 
45 
 
0.06 
 
2,985 
 
1,466 
*    p-value (two-sided) < .10  **    p-value (two-sided) < .05  ***   p-value (two-sided) < .01  
 
The p-values are computed using White’s robust standard errors (White [1980]). In addition, the estimator of variance used assumes the observations are not 
independent but that they are divided in M groups (i.e., firms) G1, G2, ..., GM that are independent. Specifically, the estimator is $V ( )( )' ( )u uG Gk
M
=
∑ 1 $V , where $V  = (∂2ln 
L/∂β2)-1 and uk(G) is the contribution of the kth group to the scores ∂ln L/∂β (Huber [1967] and Rogers[1993]). 
 Table 5 
Relative Explanatory Power of the Three Hypotheses 
 
 
z-statistics resulting from Vuong Test (1989). Negative/(positive) values 
indicate that the first/(second) group of variables explains significantly 
more of the variance in compensation. 
 
The variables are grouped according to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Total Fixed Assets, Total Program Expenses 
 
H2: Administrative Efficiency, Dollar Growth in Contributions 
 
H3: Commercial Revenue Share, Expenses/Liquid Assets, and 
       Investment Portfolio/Total Assets 
 
 
Panel A: Vuong Tests on Full Sample Regressions Reported in Table 3: 
 
 
H1 vs. 
H2 & H3 
H2 vs. 
H1 & H3 
H3 vs. 
H1 & H2 
   Total CEO   
   Compensation 0.57 0.31 -0.57 
   CEO Salary 0.53 0.32 -0.53 
   CEO Benefits 2.11** 1.62 -2.15** 
    
    
Panel B: Vuong Tests on Full Sample Regressions Reported in Table 4: 
 
 
H1 vs. 
H2 & H3 
H2 vs. 
H1 & H3 
H3 vs. 
H1 & H2 
   Arts 3.35*** -1.62 -3.48*** 
   Education 1.70* 0.07 -1.75* 
   Health 0.56 0.32 -0.57 
   Human Services -7.11*** -8.13*** 6.81*** 
   Religious 1.34 -1.00 -1.46 
   Other 1.24 0.53 -1.29 
*       p-value (two-sided) < .10  
**     p-value (two-sided) < .05   
***   p-value (two-sided) < .01  
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Notes 
 
1 U.S.C. §501(c)(3). 
2 This discussion draws upon Lakdawalla and Philipson (1999) and Philipson and Posner 
(2000). 
3 In addition, nonprofit organizations are required to pay an unrelated business income tax 
(UBIT) on any unrelated trade or businesses that is regularly carried on and is not 
substantially related to the organization's  exempt purpose. 
4 Failure by Certain Charitable Organizations to Meet Certain Qualification Requirements; 
Taxes on Excess Benefit Transactions, 63 Fed. Reg. 41, 486, 41,501 (1988). 
5 Occasionally, the IRS would enter into closing agreements with charities to resolve 
conflicts over excessive compensation, but this too was also seen as a stringent measure. 
6 For example, Tax Court found in People of G-d Community vs. Commissioner that the 
payment of a percentage of gross receipts to a pastor violated the non-distribution constraint 
(75 T. C. 127, 132 (1980). 
7 See Murphy (1998) for summary of research. 
8 The robust estimator of variance assumes the observations are not independent but that they 
are divided in M groups (i.e., firms) G1, G2, ..., GM that are independent. The estimator 
becomes $V ( )( )' ( )u uG G
k
M
=
∑ 1 $V , where $V  = (∂2ln L/∂β2)-1 and uk(G) is the contribution of the kth 
group to the score  ∂ln L/∂β (Huber 1967; Rogers 1993). 
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9 Due to accounting flexibility, some nonprofits may allocate a disproportionate share of joint 
costs to program rather than administrative activities. Hence, our variable measures reported 
rather than actual administrative efficiency. The variable may be biased of we have omitted a 
variable correlated with this misallocation. 
10 Due to data limitations, we are unable to distinguish between growth in unrestricted and 
restricted contributions.  
